


Maritime Insurance against acts of terrorism

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1. Introduction


- Scarce information
- Massive damages
- Shipping, cruising and passenger ferries as targets
- Many alternatives available to perpetrate terrorista attacks (v.g. cyber attacks)
- High-risk zones, Areas of Perceived Enhanced Risk (APER)
- Navigation Warranties, Navigation Limits Clauses
- Usage Based Insurance (UBI)



- How to calculate risk, how to calculate actuarially correct premiums
- Baird Webel: «For the insurer to operate successfully and avoid bankruptcy, it is critical to accuarately estimate the probability of a loss and the severity of that loss so that a suficient premium can be charged»

2. Shipping, Cruising, and the terrorist shadow. A definition

- Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (1937): «acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public»
- Directive (EU) 2017/541 (Art. 3): list of acts committed with one of the following aims: «(a) seriously intimidating a population; (b) unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act; (c) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation»
- International Cargo Clauses (Joint Cargo Committee of the Lloyd's Market Association) Termination of Transit Clause (Terrorism) 2009
- «an act of any person acting <u>on behalf or, or in connection with, any organisation</u> which carries out activities directed towards the <u>overthrowing or influencing, by force or violence</u>, of any <u>government</u> whether or not legally constituted or any <u>person acting from a political, ideological or religious motive</u>»




3. Marine insurance and terrorism. Some peculiarites

- The maritime industry environment. The supply chain
- Help from IoT and GIS (Geographical Information Systems)
- Looking for compensation: injured, owners, workers, mortgagor, mortgagee, shareholders, agentes
- The liabilities:
- terrorists and their organisations (?);
- Ship owners or operators, employees;
- Port operators and port authorities;
- Security advisors




- BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO, OCIMF, IUMI, etc.: Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships
- USA: NIST Framework (NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology's Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity)
- ISO and International Electrotechnical Commission: 27001 Standard on information technologies
- Port State Control and Cyber Risk Management
- Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 «concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union»; Proposal for DIRECTIVE repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 COM(2020) 823 final 2020/0359 (COD)






- Negligence
- Causation
- Evidence
- Occurrence and per occurrence limits of liability



4. Terrorism and Insurance. Availability

- Before 9/11
- After 9/11: exclusion clauses
- How to put the market back on track?
- USA: Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) and Terrorism Risk Insurance Program (TRIP)
- UK already had Pool Re: but marine policies not covered
- Russia, France, Spain, Australia, etc.
- Institute Cargo Clauses (A): excludes cover for loss, damage or expense «caused by any act of terrorism» (Clause 7.3.) or «caused by any person acting from a political, ideological or religious motive» (Clause 7.4).




- Institute Strikes Clauses (Cargo): cover for loss or damage caused by «any act of terrorism» (Clause 1.2), and by «any person acting from a political, ideological or religious motive», although limited by the Transit Clause (Clause 5)
- See also Institute War and Strikes Clauses (Clauses 1.5 and 1.6).
- Cover for NCBR attacks is rare
- Joint Cargo Committee Cyber Exclusion and Write-Back Clause (CL437), paramount
- «1. In no case shall this insurance cover any loss, damage, liability or expense directly or indirectly caused by, contributed to or arising from: 1.1. the failure, error or malfunction of any computer, computer system, computer software programme, code, or process or any other electronic system; or 1.2. the use or operation, as a means for inflicting harm, of any computer, computer system, computer software programme, malicious code, computer virus or process or any other electronic system [...]»



Alternatives to try to make coverage available:

- a) Mandatory legal provisions imposing coverage;
- b) Public support (reimbursement) to insurance companies;
- c) Other economic incentives (tax...);
- d) Insurance pools, insurance funds;
- e) CAT Bonds;
- f) Co-insurance.



5. Preliminary conclusions

- Pools with insurance and reinsurance companies?
- But:
- National risks only?
- Exclusions of maritime insurance are frequent
- What about high seas? International Convention and Fund?
- Market inefficiencies and incentives to stay still